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Abstract 
Journalists and policy makers give the impression that western education is a 
good, cheap way to spread democracy and spur development. The US government 
spends $243 million a year to help subsidize foreign students. Conventional wisdom 
also implies that education enables a culture of democracy and common identity. 
However, scientifically, are authoritarian leaders being educated in western classes more 
likely to promote democratization and economic development? With this question, I 
collected data of authoritarian leaders’ educational background from 1960 to 2000 with 
three categories: western education, local education and military education, in an effort 
to examine the rightfulness of the previous arguments. Based on this original dataset, 
two models are built in this paper regarding the influences of western education on 
democratization and economic development which are featured by the change of polity 
score and GDP growth rate respectively. Unlike previous researches and arguments, I 
find no correlations between authoritarian leaders’ western education and the 
promotion of reforms in the corresponding countries. The author argues that 
authoritarian leaders being educated in western countries are at almost at the same level 
with their counterparts in promoting democratization and developing economy. 
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1. Introduction  
“Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the 
world.” 
---Nelson Mandela 
Education has always been a significant factor in socialization and furthermore 
in political issues. Countries are spending more and more on this field believing that 
people’s ideology and identity, so to speak, are influenced greatly by education. 
Admittedly, education is a tool to make a better world – with more techniques, skills, 
critical thinking and logical reasoning cultivated in students. However, the correlation 
between educating students and “cultivating” their political identity as well as ideology 
is questionable. There is no evidence showing that students being educated in western 
countries are more pro-democracy than students educated in an authoritarian regime, or 
the number of students in autocracy supporting democratization is less than those in 
non-autocracies. Indeed it may have a very high probability that students in 
authoritarian regimes are even more pro-democratization and believing a democratic 
institution to be a better system. People living in a society are more likely to notice the 
disadvantages of the institutions they have. People living in authoritarian countries 
suffering from one-party regimes or restrictions on speeches and gradually think 
democratic countries are perfect. However, in democratic regimes, people may realize 
the problems of the system such as lower efficiency, the underneath “plutocracy”, gun 
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control, initiating wars to fawn on rich ammunition merchants, etc. Therefore, 
supporting democratization or not may not or cannot be “manipulated” by education.  
In an effort to test whether being educated in a western democratic regime is an 
important factor in authoritarian leaders’ promoting of democratization, I collected an 
original data from 1960 to 2000 including almost all the authoritarian countries’ leaders 
in the world and applied scientific approaches to examine whether policy makers and 
researchers’ arguments on this issue is correct. I am not arguing against the overall great 
influences education can make on changing the world. The focus will be the influence of 
authoritarian leaders’ western education on the sheer change of the regimes’ 
democratization and economic development.  
 
1.1 Research Question 
Generally, this paper is aiming at seeking an answer for authoritarian regimes’ 
development and democratization – why some countries are more likely to enjoy 
economic growth or political reforms while others not. More specifically, the author 
wants to probe the impact of authoritarian leaders’ education on the countries reforms 
and changes. In 1990, out of 115 world leaders, 66 studied abroad and more than two 
thirds if only authoritarian countries are considered. This figure has continued to 
increase for the past twenty years. Will western-educated leaders in authoritarian 
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regimes be more likely to promote reforms in their country than their counterparts such 
as locally-educated leaders or those being trained in military bases that have no western 
educational background? Papers and articles are bragging about the political influences 
of education, especially education in a western democratic country. If there are 
correlations between leaders’ educational background and the countries’ democratic 
reforms as well as economic development, then which one is more correlated? Are they 
more likely to choose developing economy or improving political environment? If there 
is no correlation, previous literature and articles will be open to question. 
This paper is to question and examine the legitimacy of papers and articles 
correlating western democratic education and leaders’ motivations as well as capability 
of reforms by adopting scientific research approaches. From theoretical perspective, 
democratization and GDP growth are caused by numerous factors including domestic 
and international factors which most literature has covered. This paper is not arguing 
against the existence of these influences. Instead, they are partly included in the two 
models in this paper in order to test if education really matters in democratization and 
economic development by controlling other possible factors.  
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1.2 Literature Review 
Previous literature on democratization seldom focuses on how leaders’ 
educational background could have an influence on countries’ political reforms. Most 
research sets the independent variables as economic development1, colonial history2, 
income growth and inequality3, religion, oil resources4, conflicts5 or international 
context.6 
These factors could be categorized as domestic impacts and international 
influences. This paper is not denying the importance and relevance of these internal and 
                                                     
1Boix, Carles, and Susan Stokes, 2003, “Endogenous Democratization”, World Politics, 55(4): 517-549.Geddes, 
Barbara. 1999. “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?”Annual Review of Political 
Science, 2(1):115-44.Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, 
2000“Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990”, 
NewYork, Cambridge University Press 
 
2Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation." American Economic Review, 91(5): 1369-1401. 
 
3Bollen, Kennethand Robert W.Jackman, 1985, “Political Democracy and the Size Distribution of Income”, 
American Sociological Review, 50(4): 438-457.Freeman, John and Quinn, Dennis P. 2012. “The Economic 
Origins of Democracy Reconsidered.”American Political Science Review. 106(1): 58-80.Ben Ansell and David 
Samuels. 2010. “Inequality and Democratization. A Contractarian Approach.” Comparative Political 
Studies ,43(12): 1543-74 
 
4Ross, Michael, 2012, “The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations”, 
Princeton University Press. 
 
5North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry Weingast.“Violence and the Rise of Open Access 
Orders.”Journal of Democracy.20(1): 55 -69. 
 
6Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede and Ward, Michael D. 2006.‘‘Diffusion and the International Context of 
Democratization,’’ International Organization, 60(4):  911-933Brinks, Daniel and Coppedge, Michael. 2006. 
‘‘Diffusion is no illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the  Third Wave of Democracy,’’ Comparative Political 
Studies, 39(4): 463—89 
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external factors with democratization. I am proposing the significance of authoritarian 
leaders’ educational background. The role of leaders or a limited number of elites is 
debated and the argument that leaders and elites are very important and significant in 
the reforms and changes has been quite popular. Talcott Parsons in 1960 wrote that 
"within the existing elites, such people are most likely to be found among intellectuals, 
especially those who have direct contacts with the West, particularly through education 
abroad or under western auspices at home"7. History textbooks mostly are filled with 
famous peoples and their influences on the trajectory of history. Domestic and 
international contexts are important, but we cannot ignore the role of leaders, especially 
in authoritarian regimes.  
In 1959, SeyMour Martin Lipset emphasized the importance of education in 
political reforms, arguing that  
“Education presumably broadens men’s outlooks, enables them to 
understand the need norms of tolerance, restrains then from adhering to 
extremist and monistic doctrines, and increases their capacity to make 
rational electoral choices… If we cannot say that a high level of education 
is a sufficient condition for democracy, the available evident condition 
does suggest that it comes close to being a necessary condition. ”8 
 
                                                     
7Parson, Talcott, 1960 “Structure and Process in Modern Societies”, Glencoe, Ill. : Free Press 
8Lipset, Seymour Martin, 1959, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, 53(1), pp. 69-105 
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Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared tried to check if Lipset was right on 
this issue by testing the causal relation between overall educational levels and 
democratization. Instead they find no robustness at all in a five-year period test.9So they 
suspect that maybe in a long run mass education can have an influence, or there exists 
an omitted variable that correlate both with democratization and education. In 2009, 
Spilimbergo used a unique panel dataset on foreign students during 1950 to 2003from 
the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook in order to explore the causal relation between 
democratization and the amount of foreign students; he showed that foreign-educated 
individuals promote democracy in their home country, “only if the foreign education is 
acquired in democratic countries”.10 His model also includes a variety of control 
variables, such as democracy in trading partners, neighboring countries, level of income, 
and level and stock of education, etc.. 
Gift and Krcmaric add on to this debate of whether education is part of the 
reason for democratization by showing substantial correlation between western 
education and the corresponding countries’ democratization prospects with the 
                                                     
9Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, Pierre Yared, “From Education to Democracy?”The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 95, No. 2, 2005 
10Spilimbergo, Antonio, “Democracy and Foreign Education" American Economic Review, Vol.99,No. 1: 528-
543, 2009 
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emphasis on the leaders’ socialization process and networks with western democratic 
countries. 11 
As for leaders’ educational background and how it influences the economic 
growth, there are also a couple of scholars testing the causal relation. A strong and neat 
one is presented by Juan Gabriel Valdeson the Pinochet regime's economists, known as 
the Chicago Boys. After graduating from the University of Chicago, they seized the 
chance in 1973 military coup to launch the first radical free market strategy thus 
boosting the economy of Chile.12 There is also research on leaders’ education and the 
influences on the income growth of the nation, showing positive correlation between 
them.13However, there is no general research testing on a broader scale regarding how 
authoritarian leaders’ education influences the economic development of their origin 
countries. 
 
                                                     
11Gift, Thomas and Krcmaric, Daniel, “Who Democratizes? Western-educated Leaders and Regime 
Transitions”, working paper, (http://people.duke.edu/~tcg12/GiftKrcmaric_WhoDemocratizes.pdf) 
 
12Valdes, Juan Gabriel, 2008,“Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School of Economics in Chile” Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1st edition 
 
13Jones, Benjamin F., Benjamin A. Olken. 2005. “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth since 
World War II”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(3): 835-864 
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1.3 Limitations 
This paper puts heavy emphasis on authoritarian individual leaders in terms of 
reforms. Most literature on democratization and development view states as “machines” 
with different parts coordinating together, such as institutions and domestic factors. 
These impacts from the opposition party, coalitions or groups of elites are important 
admittedly. However, if we analogically use “cars” as a metaphor of countries –the 
driver’s decisions and characteristics will be more significant to the results.  
Therefore, viewing authoritarian regimes as a single unit led by the leaders is one 
key limitation of the paper. The author underlines the importance and significance of 
top leaders or limited number of elites in the social changes.  More specifically, 
authoritarian states are more like “cars”. Though they have engines and external 
environment, mostly it is steered by the driver, which is the dictator, head of the country. 
Whether the country is heading north or south is under the control of drivers’ will. This 
is one of the assumptions for this paper and can also be viewed as a limitation.  
Authoritarian leaders are powerful and the center of power. Their ideas and decisions 
are more likely to be carried out compared with any other people’s proposals in the 
country. Therefore, in this paper, instead of following the previous thoughts on other 
levels of explanations, the author underscores the leaders’ will, and how a leader can 
make a difference. Also, most of the time, leaders being elected or designated are eager 
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to make their people better off and their country prosper. This is partly due to the 
reputation concerns which pressures them and partly due to their sense of patriotism 
and emotional connections. 
 
1.4 Roadmap 
This paper will proceed as follows. The next section will lay out a hypothetical 
theoretical foundation on how western education could have possible correlations with 
democratization and development based on common wisdom and traditional logical 
reasoning. It consists of five hypotheses including the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between leaders’ education and reforms. There are also three possible mechanisms 
which are enlightening power, strong motivation and political identity. After theoretical 
analysis, there will be an empirical test of the proposed theory, sorted by data, method 
and evidence, including how the data was trimmed and the legitimacy of the chosen 
method. There are limitations of the original data and methodology, which will also be 
discussed in this section.  
This will then be followed by a detailed discussion on the empirical results and 
findings which are very different from the conventional wisdom and “stereotypes” 
regarding the main independent variable “education”. There are also discussions on 
other variables. At last, I will conclude that leaders with higher education from western 
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democratic country does not seem to have higher probability to promote political 
reforms or economic development compared with leaders with other types of education. 
 11 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Psychologically speaking, education could have a fundamental influence on 
students’ outlook of life and world. The knowledge and information they take in will 
live with them inevitably for the rest of life. This is also the reason why almost every 
country devotes millions and billions of dollars into educational cultivation and patriotic 
education early for students in various ways either directly or indirectly. In this vein, 
studying in western democratic countries will help form the basis political knowledge 
and a different outlook which is more similar to western liberal and democratic 
paradigm. The channels making the common ideology possible are in-class and out-of-
class education as well as experience. 
However scientific analysis of this may tell a different story. Most leaders went 
abroad at their twenties which means that they’ve been spending the previous twenty 
years in the home countries may have determined who they are and where they belong 
especially that they are a self-selection group of people choosing to return back home. 
Furthermore, the locally educated leaders may also know about democratization by 
watching videos or reading books. When the great pressure comes from the society 
pushing for reforms, no matter where the leaders get their degrees, they will have to 
spur the political reforms or being kicked out of office due to the incapability.  
Ideological speaking, by living in the developed democratic countries, the 
students’ basic political ideology and identity might form with the influencing power of 
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both the society and government. Students may gradually realize the legitimacy of a 
democratic government and think that institutions and governing modes in a democracy 
is better than autocracy regarding both the people and the nation as a whole. In this vein, 
they are attracted by the subtle yet powerful “propaganda” of democracy. On the other 
hand, studying in western democratic countries is more likely to cultivate leaders with 
higher capability to govern country and knowing how to boost the market and economy. 
Most of those being educated in western countries then went back to become leaders 
were majoring in law or economy during their study in western countries. (Figure 1)  
 
Figure 1. Distribution of western-educated leaders’ majors (1960-2000) 
What’s more, after experiencing the benefits of capitalist and liberal market, they 
might be inclined to and more motivated to develop the economy in the home 
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countries.1 However, it may be also true if leaders being educated in western liberal 
democratic countries do not maximize their countries’ democratization and economic 
development. Therefore, there might be four categories of leaders regarding their 
promoting economy or politics elaborated in the following four hypotheses.  
 
2.1 Hypotheses 
Education has a broad scope: primary education, higher education, liberal study, 
literature, history, etc. Each has different influences on students’ characteristics or value 
systems with specific features. Liberal Arts students differ from math majors; graduate 
students differ from high schools’. There is also a special group of students growing up 
in authoritarian regimes yet getting degrees from western democratic countries. Some of 
them then come back to home countries and become leaders. In-class education and out-
of-class experience can enrich and enlighten their life as well as their thoughts. 
However, people are people. Even after being educated in democratic countries, some 
may still hold previous outlook and identity, or simply continue being a “rational 
player” making rational choices without considering the consequences. Some may 
return back and continue dictatorship like their predecessor and simply sitting on the 
throne. Therefore, there might be no correlations between education and democratic 
                                                     
1Spilimbergo, Antonio 2009. “Democracy and Foreign Education", American Economic Review, 99(1): 528-543. 
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reforms at all. So, if there are correlations between education and reforms, based on the 
leaders’ home countries’ economic development scale and polity score change, there are 
four types of leaders, coined as “favorable leaders”, “masterful leaders”, “liberal 
leaders”, and “unfavorable leaders” (Table 1). If there is no correlation between these 
two factors, then the previous papers and articles on the significant influences of leaders’ 
education on reforms will be questioned. 
Table 1 Four types of leaders based on their promoting of political or economic 
development 
Scenarios Polity Scores Increase Polity Scores Decrease 
Positive GDP Growth Favorable Leaders Masterful Leaders 
Negative GDP Growth Liberal Leaders Unfavorable Leaders 
 
Leaders fostering both economic development and political reforms are 
favorable leaders such as Lee Teng Hui; boosting economy but not political 
democratization are masterful leaders, such as Lee Kuan Yew and Deng Xiaoping; 
pushing political reforms yet putting less efforts in economic growth are liberal leaders 
such as Chang Myun or Uganda President Godfrey Binaisa; leaders who fail to propel 
either economic development or political reform are labeled as unfavorable leaders. 
What I am very interested in is that compared with leaders who are not educated in 
western democratic countries, which type of the four categories this special group of 
authoritarian leaders are more likely to belong to.  
 15 
2.1.1 Ordinary Leaders 
H0: This is no difference between western-educated leaders and leaders being educated or 
trained in a different place regarding democratization and economic reforms. 
It is possible that western educated leaders return back to their home country 
and having almost exactly the same preference or motivation to promote 
democratization or economic development. This will be shown in the model as no 
significant correlation or very subtle estimated effects.  
This scenario of statistical significance is possible since leaders being educated in 
western countries might not be different from leaders educated locally or in military 
bases. Students who have no experience of western study can also be interested in 
democracy and liberalization. With the increasing transparency, availability and fastness 
of information, they can find everything from the internet and don’t necessarily have to 
go abroad to experience everything to know about western liberal democracy.  Also, 
some leaders studying abroad and then return back to home country have political 
ambitions and the western experience is a tool for them to open the gate of politics back 
home and higher possibility to climb up the political ladders. What’s more, people who 
have not been to western democratic countries may have a cabinet full of dashing young 
graduates being educated or growing up in western capitalist democracies. Therefore, 
these may lead to the final insignificance of the correlation between 
democratization/development and western education.  
 16 
2.1.2 Favorable Leaders 
H1: Leaders with western education are more likely to be favorable leaders compared with 
leaders being educated locally or militarily.  
Leaders being educated in western countries to some extent could be 
psychologically, sociologically and professionally different from leaders with other 
background. This possibly could make them favorable leaders propelling both economic 
and political reforms. Psychologically speaking, education could bring them more 
emotional bonds to the western culture and civilization. The experience of living in a 
western democratic country itself may add on to the western influences. People they 
meet every day, articles and books they read in class or out of class, food they buy in the 
supermarket and restaurants they often dine in, etc. can all contribute to their value 
system and world view. Perhaps they will be more convinced by the western political 
and economic systems and become eager to build similar institutions back in home 
countries. And after realizing the deep gap between the origin country and host country, 
they may be greatly motivated to promote the home country to keep up with the 
developed countries where they’ve been studied in. Generally speaking, leaders’ 
educational background seems to have association with the probability of them 
executing reforms.2 
                                                     
2 Axel Dreher, Michael J. Lamla, Sarah M. Rupprecht and Frank Somogyi, “The Impact of Political Leaders'  
Profession and Education on Reforms” (http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/50822/1/520092163.pdf) 
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2.1.3 Masterful Leaders 
H2: Leaders with western education are more likely to be masterful leaders comparing 
with leaders being educated locally or militarily.  
After enjoying the sufficient life necessity and unlimited material resources as 
ordinary persons in western countries, leaders may have the incentive to develop their 
home countries so that ordinary people in their countries could live in such an affluent 
place. However, in terms of politics, western-educated leaders may not want to fully 
democratize the country due to the advantages of high efficiency.  
Take Singapore leader Lee Kuan Yew as an example. He graduated from 
Cambridge Law School and served the country since the pre-independent era. He made 
piles of reforms but political reform regarding democratization. In his mind, governance 
of country is more about efficiency and effectiveness. Singapore, under his governance, 
became a miracle in economic development but politically, it is still an authoritarian 
regime. He is also a firm believer of meritocracy. And he once said, “If Singapore is a 
nanny country, I am proud to have fostered one.”3Also, being educated in western 
countries may favor them by the bonds and networks they have with local people who 
later happen to be powerful in either commerce or politics. These bonds can serve as 
valuable resources for them to development economy in a way of drawing foreign direct 
investment (FDI) or building more economic connections that may boosting the market. 
                                                     
3Lee, Kuan Yew. 2000. “Third World to First, The Singapore Story: 1965-2000”,Harper Collins, 1st Edition. 
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What’s more, most authoritarian leaders care about reputation. If they could make their 
countrymen’s life better off, the praise and good reputation will stay in the history. So 
this is what Lee has done – let his people living a better life yet the power of doing so is 
based on the controlling power in his pocket. Another example is Deng Xiaoping, 
educated in France and assumed leadership in China in late 1970s. He pushed forward 
the opening up reform in 1978 yet refused to open any further beyond economic zone. 
Any political reform proposals were killed in cradles and any plan regarding 
democratization was aborted. Therefore, it might be a second hypothesis that leaders 
with western education will be more likely to boost economy instead of political reform. 
2.1.4 Liberal Leaders 
H3: Leaders with western education are more likely to be liberal leaders compared with 
leaders being educated locally or militarily. 
Liberal leaders are more likely to give impetus to political reforms rather than 
economic development. Western educated leaders, after being educated in a democratic 
environment, might be more capable of pushing forward political liberalization. 
However, economically, they are less likely to devote greatly since political reform may 
bring pressure on economic development. For example, South Korea leaders Chang 
Myun, he promoted greatly to the political reforms, but not the economic growth. His 
political reforms on individual liberty generated chaos and instability of the society and 
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economy was pulled back.4On the other hand, even if they are pushing forward the 
economic growth, leaders who are locally educated may also dedicate to economic 
development with higher efficiency due to the centralization of power. In this case, the 
economic growth of those countries led by western educated leaders will not witness 
significant economic development compared with those led by locally educated leaders. 
Aside from this, leaders with western education may be eager to develop their home 
country, but realize the institutions are too old, rigid and restraining to unleash the 
economic development. Therefore they started to develop political environment first 
and then push forward economic development a few years later.  
2.1.5 Unfavorable Leaders 
H4: Leaders with western education will be more likely to be unfavorable leaders 
compared with leaders being educated locally or militarily.  
“Rational choice theory” argues that the social behavior of human beings is 
based on the wanting of more rather than less of a good.5Leaders are human beings and 
they are inevitably wanting more than less for themselves. Assuming their rational 
behavior and breaking the old authoritarian power system may be a big obstacle for 
their getting more, liberalization and democratization will be aborted since they will lose 
                                                     
4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chang_Myon 
5Lawrence E. Blume and David Easley, “Rationality”, June 2007, http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~leb/rat03.pdf 
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the absolute power by democratization as well as property by liberalization. In this case, 
greatly promoting political and economic reforms is almost impossible. So, as a rational 
person, the leader may be unwilling to unleash his power to others. Compared with 
other two groups of leaders, those with higher western education may be more able to 
do or better at doing what is in their mind. So there might be more unfavorable leaders 
among the western educated group.  After perceiving the best interests for them, these 
leaders with more capability and have higher western education will be more likely to 
achieve their goals.  
 
2.2 Hypothetical Theory 
Yeats says, “Education is not the filling of a pail, but the lighting of a fire”. If the 
fire is being enlightened, it may light up a whole country. Leaders being educated in 
western democratic countries have psychological cultivation, sociological bonds and 
professional competence. And their being leaders could be the channel bring western 
development and democracy to their home countries. This paper holds that 
authoritarian leaders with western education will be different from leaders with other 
types of education, and these features could be reflected in their approaches of 
governance and policy preference.  
 21 
2.2.1 Enlightening power 
Education enlightens young people at the very starting point of their life before 
they enter society. It includes teaching formal knowledge such as reading, writing, and 
math, as well as other things such as morals, values, and ethics. Learning these does not 
mean that leaders can have their world outlook totally changed from the one formed in 
the past ten or twenty years in their home country. Instead, it is an enlightening process, 
lightening up an approach of reform that they may have never seen or experienced. This 
experience expands their visions and perspectives.  
These influences can be divided into two categories: macro-level and micro-level 
impacts. From macro-level analysis, education is not merely inside the specific schools 
or specific rules; rather a more general influence from the whole social institutions in the 
country. Clearly we could see the differences between democratic and authoritarian 
institutions that could have influences on education. In authoritarian regimes, things, 
especially sensitive things, are not very much transparent. Social media are mostly the 
tools for government propaganda. Whole environment of society is either violent or 
unstable, or repressive. In this vein the social forces lead the educational institution to 
instill more values about obedience and listen instead of challenge authority and 
questioning. However, in democratic countries, the environment is different. Students 
can pick whatever debate topic they can; join or hold whatever kinds of organization or 
union they like. The freedom of speech also add on to the open environment, leading to 
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a more liberal and tolerant social environment. Aside from general environment, they 
have different ideological instillation. Previously my thought is that only authoritarian 
regimes are good at propaganda and PR itself to attract peoples. They try to make it 
widely known that the legitimacy of the party or the person is unshakable and only 
rules by this government will benefit people. However, I also realize in western 
countries, especially democratic countries, ideology and the instillation of certain 
paradigm can never be weaker than authoritarian regimes. In the 1990s most people buy 
western ideology because of the attractiveness of this paradigm. However, the 
attractiveness lies in the “propaganda” in a more subtle and smart way. Same is to 
western education. The instillation of western values, or the so-called universal values 
which are not universally successful, can also be strong in either schools or other social 
institutions. Students under western democratic environment will be more likely 
attracted by the set of philosophical values and paradigm which will later be deeply 
rooted in their mind. 
From micro-level perspective, education in democratic countries emphasizing 
more on critical thinking and challenging the past knowledge. Especially in the US, 
students can raise questions in the middle of class when teachers are talking. This has 
nothing to do with irrespective deeds in a western classroom. Yet, in most autocracies, 
students are not supposed to ask questions during the class. They need to ask them after 
class because when teacher is talking they are supposed to be listening instead of 
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questioning. This can create a sense of ignorant obedience. What’s more, textbooks 
especially history textbook are the key channel to instill ideas and values. It is very hard 
to be objective for almost everyone when it comes to history no matter on home country 
or the whole world. This innate bias will surely be embodied in textbooks. No exception 
for all countries, though in some cases the bias may be lighter while in others heavier. 
This dissimulation of values and ideas will greatly influence the foreign students from 
authoritarian regimes if the paradigm can successfully attract those students. Moreover, 
western democratic counties happen to be richer and more affluent than authoritarian 
countries. Commercialization and capitalism is deeper and more mature in western 
countries. Therefore, students, especially young people, are inclined to be attracted by 
the “colorful world” instead of daddies’ or predecessors’ dull and serious air filled with 
forbidding rules. Therefore, if they later become authoritarian leaders, breaking down 
those rules and building new ones will surely be a must. 
This whole process of macro-level and micro-level influences could be both 
under the socialization process. Students being educated in classes are being socialized 
at the same time. One of the founders of the modern sociology, Emile Durkheim, 
believes that  
"Society can survive only if there exists among its members a sufficient 
degree of homogeneity; education perpetuates and reinforces this 
homogeneity by fixing in the child, from the beginning, the essential 
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similarities that collective life demands. And education consists of a 
methodical socialization of the young generation”6 
 
Socialization is, to some extent, to make people alike and get them ready to get 
into a certain society. And education serves this purpose well by generating a group of 
people with similar fundamental beliefs. However, among different societies, education 
and socialization processes are different so as to generating students with different 
views and beliefs. Therefore, if leaders educated in a western country, it is highly likely 
that they grasp the western ideology more and have stronger common identity with 
western democratic communities.7 
2.2.2 Strong Motivation 
Most leaders who have been educated in western countries are more likely to be 
highly motivated to develop their own country. This is partly because of their eagerness 
to build a country that can catch up with the country where they have been studied in; 
and partly because they have been undergoing a stage of emotional uneasiness when 
they first come to the host countries. This feeling becomes stronger as they staying in the 
developed country which triggers their strong motivation to make a difference.  
Living in a developed country is more comfortable than living in a developing 
country regarding material sufficiency and spiritual needs. However, for those who 
                                                     
6Durkheim, Emile, 1956, “Education and Sociology”, Free Press 
 
7Akerlof, George. A and Rachel. EKranton, “Identity and Economics of Organization”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 19(1): 9-32 
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newly arrive at a developed country from an under developed one, the first thing to 
experience is not joy or comfort; rather, it is more of uneasiness. They feel the differences 
this new place bringing to them: sufficiency of basic daily needs and necessities, 
freedom of speech and liberty, etc. Instead of comfortably staying here, there is 
uneasiness aroused questioning the differences. How come people living in developed 
countries are having a better life than those in home countries? Why eating pizza and 
drinking coke is such a normal thing but they are viewed as a luxury back in home 
countries simply because people can’t afford them? Why people can say anything they 
want to say and post on the internet freely but people even dare not hold a 
demonstration back at home countries? Why buying a nice car is a piece of cake here but 
it is a symbol of bourgeoisie back in home countries? Why students in classes here can 
ask anything in their mind and interrupt the teacher in the middle without being 
scolded? Questions like these are tons and the more questions they have, the stronger 
uneasiness they feel.  
This feeling is a trigger. After enjoying the superiority of living in a developed 
country, they feel the anxiety for going back and being devoted to the development and 
change of their country and people. This happens to Lee Kuan Yew, who became anti-
colonialist when studying in LSE. He went to study in UK, yet actively objected to the 
UK’s rule of his own country. And then he went to study at Cambridge get a JD degree. 
He fought for the self-governance after he became congressman and premier after 
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independence. During his presidency, he greatly increased the living standard of his 
people and very good reputation was obtained. Uneasiness is hard to detect for people 
living in developed countries for all their life. However subtle, this feeling exist in most 
international students who come from developing countries. Some may choose to dispel 
this uneasiness by being immersed in the coziness and change their nationalities. Some 
keep this uneasiness and return back to home country. They then become leaders and 
make a difference.  
2.2.3 Political identity 
Leaders coming back home wanting to be leaders is not an easy piece of cake in 
most cases. In cases where leaders come from an imperial or royal family, their 
legitimacy derives from their family. However, in most cases, leaders need to 
“campaign” or climb the political ladder. Even in authoritarian countries, political 
identity is important, and can even become the source of a leader’s legitimacy. Political 
identity can be considered as political beliefs and which political group they are in based 
on the fundamental policy preferences. It is like in the US, democrats are liberal donkey 
heads while republics are conservative elephants; being a democrat means supporting 
labor union, immigrants and ethnic minorities while being a republican means 
restriction on immigrants, anti-gay marriage and small government. In authoritarian 
country, one’s political path is also labeled. Being educated in western country is a label 
of liberalist and reformist. With this identity, these politicians need to on one hand 
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actively doing these with innate motivation, on the other hand living up to it because of 
how he is labeled.  
As an old saying goes, “birds of a feather flock together”. Leaders who are 
liberalist and reformist will recruit more people of the alike. Recruitment plays an 
important role in authoritarian regimes since appointment is not solely based on 
institutions; rather it is more based upon the top leaders’ will. Since the assumption is 
that leaders are rational actors, so evidently they are more willing to work with a group 
of people who have the same background. This will lead to a reinforcing impact on 
leaders’ reforming policies and it is possible that more people supporting reforms there 
will be better guidelines and pathways towards democracy. 
Therefore, recruitment is another mechanism adding up to the process of 
democratization due to consensus of the leaders’ political identity. Leaders are more 
likely to recruit people with the same political opinions so as to completely avoid the 
“bill killer” or unexpected “filibuster”. Since appointment in authoritarian regimes are 
mostly controlled by the “upper insiders” where most people see as a black box. Or even 
if there is a reform on the recruitment policies, being educated in a foreign democratic 
countries may be added in as one requirement. Therefore, more western educated 
people may be recruited into the cabinet, legislature or executive branch. In this case, 
people with liberal and democratic education are more likely to consent on reforms and 
opening up. What’s more, in autocracies, clandestine patronage is popular and mostly 
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relatives or close friends were being appointed because they have relations with some 
leaders. Therefore, friends of the western educated leaders will be easier to get into the 
cabinet or senior and key positions. These people are also on the same boat with the 
leaders, thus supporting political liberalization and democratization.  
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3. Data and Method 
Cases regarding leaders who have been educated in a western country and the 
corresponding democratization are collected originally by the author. The authoritarian 
leaders’ information can be found from Archigos dataset1. The chosen countries are a list 
of states from Jessica Weeks dataset on Authoritarian regimes2. Based on this list of 
authoritarian states from 1960 to 2000, I subtracted leaders’ information from Archigos 
dataset and merge these two data sets into one panel data of leaders and regime types. I 
further extract data and reframe it into leader-based dataset, with leaders’ names, 
countries, in office and out of office date, regime types and polity scores when they get 
into office and when they leave. The whole dataset is not a panel data; rather, for each 
leader there contains two main time points: in office date and out of office date. The 
models are generally linear regression models with the exactly same independent 
variables and control variables in the two models.  
 
3.1 Data 
There are no specific dataset on authoritarian leaders’ educational background. 
The author collected the leaders’ education through mainly five resources. One is 
                                                     
1 H. E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, 2009, “Archigos: A Data Set on Leaders 
1875 - 2004“, Version 2.9 (http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/Archigos.2.9-August.pdf) 
  
2 Weeks, Jessica, 2012, “Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International 
Conflict,” American Political Science Review, 106(2) 
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Archigos Dataset on political leaders3; second is Lentz’s book Heads of States and 
Governments: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of over 2,300 Leaders from the year 1945 to 19924; 
third one is a biographical dictionary of modern world leaders from 1900 to 19915; fourth 
resource is mainly from Wikipedia and Britannica, mostly focusing on leaders’ 
educational background and majors; fifth resource is the leaders’ biographies or 
autobiographies if they are available. With this original dataset, I also merged it with 
other data such as GDP and Polity score and coded some variables such as US ally and 
British colony. Based on these resources the original data was built with leaders’ 
education types and in-office out-of-office years. 
There are mainly three types of educational backgrounds categorized in the data: 
western-educated, locally educated and militarily trained leaders. There can also be 
blurred boundary for some cases. For example, some leaders went to military academy 
in western democratic countries. To code this, I did not code leaders “1” for both 
western education and military training. I categorize them under western education 
instead of both. There are pros and cons for this: it makes the data categorization clearer, 
but some militarily trained leaders will be in the western educated leaders group. 
                                                     
3 http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/data.htm 
4 Lentz, Harris M. 1994. Heads of States and Governments: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of Over 2,300 Leaders, 1945 - 
1992. Jeerson, N.C.: McFarland. 
5 Frederickson, John C. 2004. Biographical Dictionary of Modern World Leaders: 1900-1991. New York, N.Y.: 
Facts on File. 
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The polity score was coded based on a case-by-case approach. The polity score 
can only demonstrate the year’s score, which cannot be specified to the month or day the 
leader left the office. Therefore, if merely merge the polity data with the original data 
based on the same in-office and out-of-office year, there will be problems due to this 
lagged effect. So, two coding rules are generated to avoid the miscoding.  
First, for leaders staying in office for more than a year, the polity score for in-
office year should be the polity score of the precede year, and the same applied the out-
of-office year. For example, President of Nigeria Balewa went into office in 1960 and was 
overthrown by coup in 1966. If merely merge the data based on the exact year of in and 
out-of-office year, it will be 8 for the year 1960 and -7 for 1966. However, in 1966 it was 
due to the coup that the score got decreased not due to President Balewa. Therefore, I 
need to code the polity score of the year precede the in-office year and out-of-office year. 
In this case, President Balewa will get the in-office polity score 8 and out-of-office score 
7. In the same vein, the succeeding Gowon junta government will be coded 7 when he 
entered office and -7 when he left. Second, in other cases where the government stayed 
in office for less than one year and it starts and ends in the same year, the coding rule 
may change a little bit: the in-office polity score will also be the polity score of the 
preceding year, but the out-of-office score will take the same year’s score as they went 
out of office.  
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As for the GDP growth rate, GDP per capita data merging with the original 
dataset, I take the preceding year of the in–office year’s GDP data as the in-office data 
and the data for the preceding year before they are out of office. For leaders who stays in 
office for less than one year and the starting and ending point are in the same year, then 
the in-office GDP data will take the preceding year’s GDP, while the out-of-office data 
will apply the exact year they went out of office. By doing so, this can minimize 
uttermost the error caused by the time lag between original data, polity score and the 
GDP data. 
 
3.2 Method 
The method applied is general linear regression model, with two key dependent 
variables and a couple of independent variables. There are two models in total: the first 
one is about the western education and its influences on polity score changes; the second 
one features economic development scale which is the growth rate as the dependent 
variable.  
The key independent variable is the educational background of leaders, 
categorized into three types: western education, local education and military academy 
training. They are dummy variables coded as “0” or “1”. The information of leaders’ 
education are assorted from several sources: Wikipedia, Encyclopedia Britannica, Lenz 
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and Fredriksen’ books on leaders’ biographic.6 Also, the coding of western education 
considers the foreign education is from a democratic country or not. If the education is 
not from a democratic country such as Soviet Union, it will not be counted as western 
higher education. Instead, it will be coded 1 under local higher education category. 
Another category is military academy education where there are a couple of leaders 
went through military education and started political career as a military officer. 
There are several controlled independent variables. One is development of a 
country, featured by GDP index. The relation between economic development and 
reforms is well articulated and proved by previous literature.7 Economic development 
can foster democratization and affluence may have a strong link with the rates of 
transition. There are various mechanisms. With better economy, there will be higher 
probability of top-down reforms in order to further unlash the political confinement of 
economic development. With more middle class asserting for civil rights, pressures will 
increase on the incumbent. Economic growth may also increase the gap between rich 
and poor in a specific period of time, thus propelling democratization.  
                                                     
6 Lentz, Harris M. 1994. Heads of States and Governments: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of Over 2,300 
Leaders, 1945 - 1992. Jeer son, N.C.: McFarland. 
Fredriksen, John C. 2004. Biographical Dictionary of Modern World Leaders: 1900-1991. New York, N.Y.: 
Facts on File. 
 
7 Boix, Carles, and Susan Stokes, 2003, “Endogenous Democratization”, World Politics, 55(4): 517-549 
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Second independent variable is oil. Natural resources especially oil can greatly 
devote to autocracy. 8Since exporting oil can lead to an increasing amount of “opaque” 
revenue, this will inevitably encourage corruption or heavy vote buying. In order to 
control oil, I set a dummy variable of all OPEC countries. Including this variable will 
control the exporting countries of oil and petroleum. What’s more, British colony was 
also controlled in this model. As shown in Boix and Strokes regression models, British 
colony has a significant influence on the transition of an authoritarian regime.  
Another control variable is the total capacity of countries. This variable is 
depicted by CINC score from COW data. The total capacity of a state can influence on 
domestic politics. The duration of leaders’ term is also included in this model. If the stay 
is quiet short then probably the chances of reforms are low, either because of short 
period of time, or an expectation of short stay. For leaders’ staying in office for a longer 
period of time, it may be correlated with the high economic growth rate or a peaceful 
transition. The total population of the country is also controlled. Democratization in 
countries with much larger population might be at different pace or facing dissimilar 
problems from countries with less population.  
The variables are not on the same scale and the coefficients might be one two 
extremes – either too small or too large. In order to make them in scale, I logged some 
large variables such as GDP data, military expenditure, and the total population. There 
                                                     
8 Ross, Michael, “Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations” 
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is also an interaction variable in the second model with leaders’ in-office duration 
interacting with western education background to see if western educated leaders 
having longer in-office time make a difference in promoting economic development. 
Also for those who are being logged, I add one to each variable to avoid biased results 
since the log of 0 is not defined and log value for 0-1 are negative. By doing so the log 
won’t change the coefficients substantially.  
 
3.3 Limitations 
One of the limitations for the data is regarding the dependent variables. First, the 
categorization of leaders’ educational types might be blurred in some cases. As 
mentioned before, the leaders’ education may be from both a western college and a 
military training, or local military school. In this case, the coder simplified them to one 
type: western military schools are coded as western education; local military schools are 
coded as military education. What’s more, the typology of leaders’ education should be 
more specific. In current dataset, leaders with western democratic education are coded 
as western; but for those who have been studied abroad in a non-democratic country I 
have coded them as being educated in a local college.  
Second limitation is the economic development dataset. There are other datasets 
that may be a better fit for economic openness or business environment. However, the 
availability of these dataset within the time scope of 1960-2000 is limited and mostly is 
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five-year based datasets. So, turning to GDP data can guarantee the availability yet not 
the best fit as the proxy for economic openness and reforms. 
Another limitation is the time period of data which is from 1960 to 2000, 
including 399 authoritarian leaders in total. The limited time range could also be a 
restriction of the findings as well as results.  
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4. Result and Discussion 
Based on the original data collected, the author first makes a distribution graph 
with leaders’ polity score change and economic growth scale located in a coordinate. 
Leaders are grouped in to the three types and each coordinate features one type of 
leader. These graphs show the distribution of leaders developing economy and 
improving political systems with no other control variables.  
First graph (Figure 2) features authoritarian countries’ reform scales with 
western-educated leaders. There are in total 85 observations. With all the leaders being 
educated in western countries, 9 of them see decreasing polity scores during their rule. 
And there are 19 of them promoting political reforms and saw increases in polity score. 
This means that more western educated leaders are capable of and inclined to increase 
their countries’ polity score by either improve the recruitment system, making political 
competition or increase the institutionalization of government authority. Most of the 
dots are scattered on the x-axles coordinate.  But at the same time there are negative 
scores for the change of polity score meaning a decreasing political openness during the 
leaders’ ruling period. Generally speaking, there are more positive growth dots than 
negatives. 
 38 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of economic growth and polity scores changes for western-
educated leaders cases (85 obs.) 
The second graph (Figure 3) is about the locally educated leaders and their 
distribution of developing economy as well as polity score increase. There are 168 
observations in total and these leaders are educated in local colleges or universities, 
including some leaders who also have a foreign degree but not in democratic countries. 
39 observations boosting political reforms and 19 of them have decreasing polity scores. 
Clearly, these leaders, compared with western-educated leaders are not very actively 
increasing the GDP growth rate and there are a couple of negative growth rates cases in 
the coordinate. Even though there are some polity score increase cases, most of the 
polity scores are centered on the x-axis with 0 polity score change or slightly negative. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of economic growth and polity scores changes for locally-
educated leaders cases (168 obs.) 
 
Third graph (Figure 4) is about the cases with militarily-trained leaders. Overall 
there are 150 observations with 36 having decreasing polity scores and 41 having 
positive polity score increase. Mostly, polity score changes are subtle and countries with 
militarily trained leaders are less likely to have high polity score increases. Interestingly 
the economic growth is very impressive for militarily educated leaders. Mostly are 
positive and even comparable to the cases of western educated leaders. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of economic growth and polity scores changes for 
militarily-trained leaders’ cases (150 obs.) 
 
4.1 Result 
Based on the originally collected dataset, two models are built to examine and 
explain the relationship between western education and political as well as economic 
development. The first model is one with polity score change as the dependent variable. 
The polity score ranges from -10 to 10 with -10 as hereditary monarchy and 10 as 
consolidated democracy. The change of polity score could be from -10 to 10 but very rare 
of this situation.  
These two models are OLS regression models with all types of education 
background variables included and also a list of control variables. Looking into the 
regression models result, we can notice several main findings with regards to 
democratization as well as development and leaders’ educational background. 
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Model 1: 
Change of Polity score ~ Western education + Duration + Local education + 
In-office GDP + in-office CINC + Change of CINC + 
In-office Democ + Amity with US + OPEC + Military Expenditure + 
Total Population + Natural Resources + Colony History 
 
Table 2 Regression model of authoritarian leaders and political reforms 
 
 
In the first model regarding democratization, leaders’ education does not have 
significant correlation with the dependent variable. There are only two variables having 
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significant relations with the political reform in this model. Military expenditure is 
positively related countries’ democratization, meaning that during the process of 
democratization, there might be an increased use of troops or arms that pull up the 
military spending. This is true to some extend since not all democratization process are 
peaceful. Indeed, most of them are violent. Many researches are focusing on the 
democratization process and conflicts as well as violence. The process requires the 
change of social norms, shift in the balance of power or the distribution of resources. 
Violence might even be inevitable and researchers have proposed an inverted U shape 
to describe the relation between violence and the process of democratization.1 This result 
of positive correlation between political transition and military spending could 
indirectly prove the significant relationship between violence and the process of political 
transition.  
Another variable is population, which has significantly negative correlation with 
political reforms. This depicts the situation where countries with larger population is 
less likely to democratize comparing with a smaller country given other variables are the 
same. Democratization does have relation with demography. One demographist once 
published a paper on Foreign Policy about Arab Spring and demography.2 In that paper, 
                                                     
1Klopp, Jacqueline M. and Elke Zuern, 2007, “The Politics of Violence in Democratization: Lessons from 
Kenya and South Africa”, Comparative Politics, 39(2), pp. 127-146  
 
2Cincotta, Richard, 2012, “Life Begins after 25: Demography and the Societal Timing of Arab Spring”, Foreign 
Policy (http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201201.cincotta.demography_arabspring.pdf) 
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general linkage can be shown between democratization and the overall population. This 
can be self-explanatory to the extent that more people means more complicated 
distribution of resources during transition and this may add on to the difficulty of 
making the political change to democracy. For other variables the p-value is not as 
significant as these two but their estimated effects are interesting. The original GDP is 
positively related to democratization, so is the Composite Index of National Capability 
(CINC) of a country. This result is consistent with the previous researches on 
democratization.3 The US allies are more likely to democratize as featured in the model 
as Amity to the US. OPEC countries are rich in oil and natural resources and this is 
negatively correlated with political reform and liberalization.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
 
3Boix, Carles, and Susan Stokes, 2003, “Endogenous Democratization”, World Politics, 55(4): 517-549 
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Model 2: 
Economic Growth~ Western education* Duration + Duration + Local education + OPEC 
In-office Democ score + in-office CINC+ Amity with US +  
Military Expenditure + Total Population + Colony History 
 
Table 3 Regression model of authoritarian leaders and economic growth 
 
In the second model, the western education and local education are all not 
significantly related with economic growth while having all other variables controlled. 
The coefficient between economic growth and duration of leaders is very significant. 
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They are positively related with discernible estimated effect. This could be related to the 
resilience of leaders’ regime and economic growth: as long as growth rates are high, 
neither dictatorships nor democracies experience challenges.4  This is also the case in 
China and Vietnam where they mix political repression and growth-generating public 
goods, producing resilient authoritarian regimes supported by excellent economic 
development.5 The military expenditure is positively correlated with economic growth, 
which is not a surprise since military spending can also boosting economy by 
stimulating employment in various industries. The original CINC score is negatively 
related to the dependent variable with very large estimated effect. If overall capacity of a 
country is already high, the growth rate might be smaller since the base number is large. 
This is also the case for the original in office GDP, which is also negatively related to the 
economic growth. As for population, this model shows that the population is positively 
related to the economic growth. For authoritarian regimes, mostly they are developing 
countries with less mature markets. The total population is a very important factor in 
boosting development. Chinese market is an example with the advantages of a large 
population; its economic growth maintained two digits for more than a decade at the 
beginning stage of economic development.   
                                                     
4Gallagher, Mary and Hanson, Jonathan K., “Authoritarian Survival, Resilience, and the Selectorate Theory”, 
Prepared for “Why Communism Didn't Collapse: Understanding Regime Resilience in China, Vietnam, 
Laos, North Korea and Cuba”. 2013, Ed. Martin Dimitrov, Cambridge University Press, chapter 7 
 
5Perrings Charles. 2006, “Resilience and Sustainable Development ”, Environment and Development Economics 
11, pp. 417–427 
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Coming back to the original question: does western education matter in 
democratization and economic development? The answer is no, different from previous 
hypotheses and traditional wisdom. Why it doesn’t matter? I will delve into this 
question in the following discussion with case analysis.    
 
4.2 Discussion 
First question, why leaders educated in western democratic regimes generally 
perform similarly to those educated in local schools or those trained in military bases? 
After reading through the list of western educated leaders and their relating 
information, I believe there are broadly three main factors summarizing the reasons.  
First is the questionable motivation for foreign degree. People choosing to study 
abroad have various reasons and goals. Some are eager for cutting-edge knowledge; 
some for the love of academic studies; some for more job opportunities; some for the 
better living conditions; and some for enhancing the value of their degrees, etc. 
However, different from the hypotheses that leaders being educated in western 
countries are more likely to be socialized by making friends with western people and 
everyday media, authoritarian leaders mostly gain this degree in order to have the 
stepping stone to get into politics or climb higher on the ladder of power at home 
country. With this political ambition in mind, their eyes won’t be blurred by the 
ideological influences since they have certain experience at home country endorsing 
 47 
them with two perspectives instead of a one-way thinking mode. As for social 
connections, people tend to seek safety feelings by finding friends with identical or 
common interests or thoughts so that they could share and then gain happiness. This is 
especially true when people coming to a new place. Based on this, these students from 
authoritarian regimes will be more likely to hang around with people of their kind 
instead of “foreigners”. Therefore, the socialization process is weakened and they are no 
more different than those educated in local college or university.  
Looking into the cases, there are leaders being educated in western countries yet 
didn’t help promoting democratization after going back to home countries. They are 
politicians playing politics and their experience of studying in western democratic 
countries is used to get to a high position. So the education could not change much on 
them. President of Chad Habre was educated in Paris majoring in Political Science and 
got his PhD. However, his rule in Chad from 1982 to 1990 was denounced with human 
rights abuses and atrocities. His bloody eight-year rule is a disaster for Chad peoples. 
His one party regime has been killing and torturing tens of thousands of his opponents.6 
He also set up a special group of force called “Documentation and Security Directorate 
(DDS)” to detect and kill political opponents. Although this was an inhumane 
authoritarian state, Chad was US ally at that time. The United States in an effort to 
balance against Libya in that area is in buttress of President Habre so as to counter 
                                                     
6 According to UN International Court of Justice  
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Qadaffi’s forces. Based on the Human Right Watch reports7, the United States provided 
Habre's DDS with training, intelligence, arms, and other support despite knowledge of 
its atrocities. Those supports and President Hebre’s western Politics education did not 
bring democratization to the country; instead, they might even teach him more about 
how to play “politics”. The polity score goes down 7 points during his governance. 
Another example is the prime minister of Thailand from 1976-1977, Thanin 
Kraivichien, who was educated in LSE majoring in Law. He returned to Thailand and 
was appointed the President of the Supreme Court of Thailand. Later on, in the 1976 
Massacre he was appointed by the king as the Prime Minister. During his one-year 
regime, the country suffered from dissolved parliament and outlawed political parties. 
Thanin's belief was anti-communism and had published books admonishing the peril of 
it. However during his ruling period, troops were sent to destroy liberal bookstores and 
burnt almost 45,000 books such as those written by Thomas More or George Orwell.8 
Also, he repressed the trade unions and deeply influenced the economic development. 
There are even students' and farmers' associations join the underground structures of 
the Communist Party of Thailand. Instead of weakening the communists, his rule was 
even a booster of communist power. The polity score was decreased by 10 in this one 
year. 
                                                     
7http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/07/trap-dictator-chad-s-hissene-habre 
 
8Kulick, Elliott and Wilson, Dick, 1996, Time for Thailand: Profile of a New Success, Bangkok: White Lotus 
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Second is the leaders’ willingness to stay in office. Democratic Peace theory 
argues that democratic countries’ leaders are caring about staying in office and fearing 
being voted out. This is almost the same for autocracies. An authoritarian leader cares 
about staying in the office and a country that under his reign. However, if he is not 
serving the people and ruling the country in a right way, the result for him might be 
very cruel, not to mention being voted out. Therefore, for authoritarian leaders, 
especially in this Information era, staying in office is very difficult no matter what kind 
of education he has. Under strong social pressure that may possibly overthrow him, 
even a member or leader of previous coup may give in and carry out political reforms. 
As I look into the cases, there are leaders who have been trained in military but also 
robust in buttressing democratization. Roh Tae-woo, a military trained leaders and 
South Korea president from 1987 to 1993, had been very active in promoting 
democratization.  In 1987 he was named by Chun as the president candidate. This 
triggered movements and rallies in South Korea called the “June Democratization 
Movement”. Under the social pressure, Roh promised to carry out reforms gradually. 
And true to his word, he remained committed to democratic reforms from the beginning 
of his reign in 1987. Another example is Poland president Jaruzelski who served in the 
military at an early age. Jaruzelski was praised as the harbinger of Poland democracy. 
He created “bicameral legislature” and legalized Solidarity. His series of domestic 
policies highly stimulated the political reforms in Poland in the late 1980s. 
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Third reason is the increasing openness of information. Countries like DPRK are 
rare recently due to globalization and the era of Information. The world is flat and 
people don’t have to go to other places to know what’s happening there. Local education 
in authoritarian regimes is increasingly objective since everything is open and available 
on the Internet, just with a click of a mouse.  Under this circumstance, there are no 
fundamental differences between local education and western education. Leaders 
haven’t been abroad can also know what is democracy and how it operates in western 
countries. Students majoring in Law or politics are learning almost the same knowledge 
as student abroad. A leader hasn’t been to western country or educated there doesn’t 
mean he doesn’t understand what is democracy and institutions. The king of Spain in 
1975 Juan Carlos have never been studies abroad, but soon after enthronement, Juan 
Carlos introduced reforms to dismantle the Francoist regime and begin the transition to 
democracy. This led to the approval of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 in a referendum, 
which established a constitutional monarchy. He was graduated from a university in 
Spain majoring in Law and a man who can boost the polity score from -7 to 8 must know 
what democracy is.  
The next question is why western education has no correlation with economic 
development in the authoritarian country. First is the leaders’ cabinet composition. Even 
the leader is not being educated in a western country or a higher degree in economy, his 
cabinet may be composed of a group of elites who are well-educated and professional in 
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boosting economy. For example, in Chile the Pinochet government, the “Chicago boys” 
are appointed to improve the Chilean economy. Even though Pinochet is a leader with 
military background, during his governance the Chile economic growth rate keeps high 
during his in office years. This is not due to his capability of promoting economy but a 
group of graduates who have been formally educated in economy.  
What’s more, boosting economy is not related to the leaders’ educational 
background. Most western educated leaders are law or politics majors. Economy is not 
their specialty, not to mention there are many factors influencing the economic 
development complicating the process of stimulating growth. Even if they hired or co-
opt people who are economy majors, let’s say, with western education, it is highly 
possible that they are having no significant difference with those educated locally. One 
problem is localization of the policies. The original economy in home country is a key 
factory to be considered while designing a policy. But for those who have been studying 
abroad, they may be less informed of the real economic situation back at home countries. 
Good policies do not equal to successful implementation. Chilean Chicago boys 
situation is an outlier – not all countries have the opportunity to have a coup and give all 
finance and economy majors a chance to overthrow all previous economic institutions 
and build a totally brand new systems. China’s opening up policy was fostered and 
propelled by Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Xi Zhongxun - none of which had been 
educated abroad, yet they know that only opening up could help Chinese economy and 
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improve people’s living conditions. Jiang Zemin used to be an engineer in China and 
educated in local college but during his term Chinese economic growth rate continued to 
be two digits. Therefore, even other factors are controlled in this model, there is no 
coefficient found between economic growth and the leaders’ educational background.
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5. Conclusion 
This paper questions the previous arguments on the relationship between 
western education and the democratization of autocracies and proves scientifically that 
there is no significant correlation. Leaders being educated in democracies don’t have 
significant distinctions from leaders who are educated in local schools, military bases or 
universities. This result is surprising given the previous arguments on and conventional 
wisdom of how western democratic civic education can bring a significant difference to 
the world democratization process. Looking into the leaders’ information one by one, I 
find interesting cases such as leaders with military training background promoting 
democratization of the country and the polity score was increased from -7 to 8, or 
leaders having law degree from western democratic countries returned back and 
implemented harsh restriction policies, etc.. So after delving into cases, I discovered that 
leaders’ western education does not necessarily relate to the democratization or 
economic growth in a couple of ways. First, the leaders’ education in western democratic 
countries may be acquired to be served as a stepping stone for them to enter the politics 
and they will still focus on their home country, learning in order to practice back at 
home, such as Singapore then Prime Minister Lee Guan Yew. Also, locally educated 
leaders, even without the experience of studying abroad, can still know about the 
western liberal democracy and how it is operated due to the advanced technology and 
deepened globalization in the information era. So, leaders don’t have to be educated in 
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western or being socialized there in order to promote political and economic reforms. 
What’s more, leaders, no matter where they get their degree, when facing the dilemma 
of being kicked out of office or stay with less personal power, they will choose to stay in 
office. This choice has little to do with leaders’ educational background. 
There are admittedly some limitations to this thesis as discussed in the above 
section. First is the over-emphasis on the authoritarian leaders. For future research, more 
leaders are needed to be added such as the leaders in the Cabinet who may have a say in 
the policy making process. Second limitation is the control variables. The data set could 
be enlarged by adding more variables related to this issue, for example, the overall 
literacy rate of the country, overall students in the authoritarian country studying 
abroad, Foreign Direct Investment, or for the economic growth rate model, conflicts, 
civil wars, neighboring democracies or capitalist countries, etc.. Third one is the coding 
rules of the dataset. If more categories of leaders’ education or their type of majors could 
be available, the results will be more convincing. For example, in the current data set, 
leaders’ foreign educational background is only coded as western if the host countries 
are democratic one. However, for leaders who acquire degrees from a foreign non-
democratic country, the coding rule arbitrally assigned to local education. What’s more, 
for future research, I would suggest more testing research on the authoritarian regimes’ 
first image analyses such as leaders’ ages or policy preferences. In the meantime, more 
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emphasis can be put on the authoritarian countries’ endogenous factors in 
democratization and development such as demographic issues.  
Back to the question: can individuals from autocracy being educated in a western 
democracy change their ideology and form strong democratic values? The U.S. 
government expects the answer to be yes, and so do most journalists and researchers. 
The US Department’s Agency for International Development and other government 
organs have spent hundreds of millions of dollars annually on drawing students from 
emerging democratic countries or autocracies to study in US with civic education. It has 
not been very successful.1  The overall proportion of western educated authoritarian 
leaders promoting democratization is fairly small among the overall autocracies’ leaders 
being educated in democracies, not to mention the proportion of students who go 
through civic education in US returning to home countries and buttressing 
democratization to the overall students being accepted and attracted to the U.S. from 
autocracies.  
From 1960 to 2000, among all the 85 leaders being educated in western countries 
and returned back to be a leader, only 9 promote the political environment featured by 
the positive increase of polity score. Thousands of students from autocracies were being 
                                                     
1 Carothers, Thomas, 1999, “Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve”, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace; 
Carothers, Thomas, 1996, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: the Case of Romania”, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace; 
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educated in the US during that period, and the chance of them going back to home 
country and becoming leaders that can promote democratization is very tiny. What the 
US government is doing by spending tax payers’ hundreds of millions of dollar on a 
field with extremely little chance to achieve their goal? The U.S. government should 
really think about this. 
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Appendix A 
List of leaders being educated in western countries: 
Country In year Out year Leader Edu. major 
Korea South 1979 1980 Choi Kuy Hay 
 Bangladesh 1981 1982 Sattar Law & Polisci 
Korea South 1960 1961 Myun Chang 
 Bulgaria 1989 1990 Mladenov IR 
Uganda 1979 1980 Banaisa Law  
Afghanistan 1971 1972 Abdul Zahir MD from Columbia 
Congo 
Brazzaville 1992 1997 Lissouba Agriculture 
Sierra Leone 1996 1997 Kabbah Law &Econ 
Sierra Leone 1964 1967 Margai, A Medicine  
Bangladesh 1996 1996 Mohammad Habibur Rahman 
Burundi 1966 1966 Ntare 
 Greece 1963 1963 Pipinelis Law &Polisci 
Greece 1963 1963 Pipinelis Law &Polisci 
Greece 1963 1963 Pipinelis Law &Polisci 
Greece 1963 1963 G. Papandreou Law  
Greece 1963 1963 G. Papandreou Law  
Greece 1963 1963 G. Papandreou Law  
Greece 1967 1967 Kanellopoulos Law  
Greece 1967 1967 Kanellopoulos Law  
Haiti 1988 1988 Manigat History  
Haiti 1988 1988 Manigat History  
Korea South 1961 1961 Chang Do Yong Social Science 
Korea South 1980 1980 Park Choong Hoon acting education  
Laos 1964 1975 Souvanna Phouma Engineer  
Laos 1960 1960 Souvanna Phouma Engineer  
Laos 1960 1960 Souvanna Phouma Engineer  
Laos 1960 1960 Souvanna Phouma Engineer  
Laos 1960 1960 Souvanna Phouma Engineer  
Laos 1962 1964 Souvanna Phouma Engineer  
Mauritania 1979 1979 Ould Sidi Economy 
Mauritania 1979 1979 Ould Sidi Economy 
Nigeria 1993 1993 Shonekan Law  
Panama 1968 1968 Arias, A. Medical-Harvard 
Sierra Leone 1967 1967 Lansana 
 Sierra Leone 1996 1996 Bio Intl. Affair 
Syria 1961 1961 Al-kuzbari Law  
Thailand 1975 1975 Seni Pramoj Law  
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Thailand 1976 1976 Seni Pramoj Law 
Thailand 1976 1976 Seni Pramoj Law  
Vietnam South 1965 1965 Quat Medicine 
Vietnam South 1965 1965 Quat Medicine 
Vietnam South 1965 1965 Khahn 
 Vietnam South 1965 1965 Khahn 
 Benin 1965 1967 Soglo Law &econ 
Benin 1963 1964 Soglo Law &econ 
Benin 1964 1965 Apithy Legal &econ 
Togo 1963 1967 Grunitzky civil engineer  
Sierra Leone 1968 1985 Stevens labor relation 
Ghana 1969 1972 Busia History  
Syria 1962 1963 El-Kudsi Law  
Benin 1991 1996 Soglo, C Law &econ 
Ghana 1979 1981 Limann Polisci 
Afghanistan 1972 1973 Mohammad Musa Shafiq Columbia 
Nicaragua 1967 1979 Anastasio Somoza Debayle West Point 
Senegal 1981 2000 Diouf Law 
Honduras 1990 1994 Callejas agricultural economy 
Syria 1961 1962 El-Kudsi Law 
Mali 1968 1991 Traore Engineer  
El Salvador 1982 1984 Magana Borjo U Chicago master 
Chad 1982 1990 Habre Polisci 
Ghana 1978 1979 Akuffo Law  
Botswana 1980 1998 Masire South Africa 
Ivory Coast 1993 1999 Konan Bedie 
 Bangladesh 1990 1991 Ahmed Politics  
Panama 1968 1981 Torrijos Herrera WHINSEC 
Afghanistan 1973 1978 Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan 
Peru 1963 1968 Belaunde Architecture 
Honduras 1994 1998 Reina social science  
Nicaragua 1990 1997 Violeta Chamorro U Virginia  
Greece 1964 1965 G. Papandreou Law  
Tanzania 1985 1995 Mwinyi Econ &History 
El Salvador 1989 1994 Cristiani Business 
Guatemala 1991 1993 Serrano Elias Stanford 
Thailand 1975 1976 Kukrot Pramoj Philosophy 
Malaysia 1970 1976 Razak Economy  
Thailand 1973 1975 Sanya Law  
Thailand 1976 1977 Thanin Kraivichien Law  
Turkey 1972 1973 Melen Finance 
Philippines 1986 1992 Aquino Math &French 
Thailand 1991 1992 Panyarachun Law  
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Thailand 1988 1991 Choonhavan 
 Indonesia 1998 1999 Habibie Engineer  
China 1980 1997 Deng Xiaoping Law  
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